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Introduction
The European Union has announced ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 2020, even if there is no wider international agreement on climate policy. In order to achieve this goal, the EU is creating a complex regulatory regime with differentiated targets, a range of policy instruments and restrictions on their application, and a variety of fungibilities between selected parts of the regulation. As a further complication, there are separate targets and instruments for renewable energy and energy efficiency; and emission reduction policy of course interacts with other arenas, including fiscal policy, industrial policy, and agricultural policy. To an outsider, the array of measures and initiatives is bewildering and clearly violates the simple prescriptions of textbook economics. As the European Commission has yet to publish a regulatory impact assessment, it is not clear to what extent the regulatory regime creates new distortions.
Nor is it clear how far current policy is removed from the cost-effective policy.
1 Therefore, this paper seeks to analyze the regulatory regime -but because of the complexities, I focus on one specific part only: the market in warrants for certified emission reductions, and its interactions with the two primary markets for emission permits in the European Union. Certified emission reductions (CERs) are the reward for companies and governments that invest in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the initiative through which rich 1 Note that the EU targets are not efficient (Tol 2007; Tol 2008) . 2 Other papers focus on the artificial separation of emission reduction targets (Boehringer et al. 2006; Klepper & Peterson 2006) , the interactions between abatement and other targets (Boehringer et al. 2008) , the interactions between climate policy and other policies (Babiker et al. 2003; Dellink & van Ierland 2006; Fischer 2008; Palmer et al. 2007; Settle et al. 2007 ), the effect on climate policy on industrial competitiveness (Kuik & Gerlagh 2003) , the functioning of the European Trading System (Benz & Trück 2009; Convery & Redmond 2007; Ellerman & Buchner 2007) , and flexibility instruments for non-ETS emissions (Reilly et al. 2006; Tol 2009 ). There are also papers on flexibility in the renewables targets (Mundaca 2008; Oikonomou et al. 2008) , and on linking EU permit markets to other permit markets (Anger 2008; Rehdanz & Tol 2005; Tol & Rehdanz 2008) .
countries can finance emission abatement project in poor countries. The CDM is part of the Kyoto Protocol and thus due to expire in 2013, but something very similar is likely to be part of the international treaty that would succeed the Kyoto Protocol. If not, the EU would probably reach bilateral agreements with key countries that host CDM projects. In any case, the EU foresees a role for the CDM in its package of policies and measures to meet its targets for 2020. In fact, the EU expects that there will be an abundant supply of cheap CERs in 2020 -and in order to preserve "environmental integrity", has placed limits on the uptake of the CDM by EU Member States. In the proposed regulation (CEC 2008b; EP 2008) , the CDM quotas of EU Member States are tradable between countries. That is, the United Kingdom, say, may purchase the right to buy CERs from Poland, say -and the UK would if its marginal costs of emission reduction are higher than in Poland. The EU has thus created a market for CER warrants. 4 As with any emission permit market, this reduces the overall cost of meeting the target -but one should not forget that this market exists by virtue of artificial restrictions placed on the primary and secondary market. As with any market with a limited number of buyers and sellers (27 in this case), there may be issues of market power, rents, and reallocation of the burden of emission reduction. These issues are explored below.
Furthermore, the market for CER warrants interacts with the other markets for emission permits: the European Trading System that has been in place since 2005 and the newly created Member State exchange for non-ETS allocations (the so-called Swedish proposal). As CERs are not tied to either market, one would expect that the CDM would bring a degree of convergence between the ETS and non-ETS markets -and that the CER warrant market would bring further convergence. These issues are also addressed by the current paper.
3 The implications of this restriction are straightforward. If emission reduction in a country is more expensive at the margin than the CER price, it should buy up to its limit. It is has yet to be investigated, however, how a national government should allocate its CDM quota to the companies in its jurisdiction. 4 Note that there is already a market for the development of CDM projects, a secondary market on which the resulting CERs are traded, and a futures market for CERs.
In Section 2, I present an analytically tractable model of emission reduction and permit trade in the European Union. The model is calibrated to the impact assessment of the 2020 targets of the European Commission. The model is simple, but captures all the relevant features. In Section 3, I investigate the properties of the market for CDM warrants and its interaction with the regulations for ETS and non-ETS emissions. Section 4 concludes.
The model and its calibration

The primary markets
Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with I countries.
Emission reduction costs C are quadratic. Without CDM, each country solves the problem:
where Y is gross domestic product, indexed by i; R is relative emission reduction; P denotes the amount of emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price (assuming a perfect market, all companies face the same price, so there is no index); E are the emissions without emission reduction, so that E(1-R)+P are the emissions with emission reduction; A are the allocated emission permits; that is, if a country emits more than has been allocated, E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or buy permits on the market; and α is a parameter. If a country's allocation exceeds its emissions, E<A, the optimization problem is:
We assume that the country sells its hot air P=E-A, and in addition reduces emissions by RE which it sells at the market for πRE. Countries with hot air are indexed by j. Countries without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market, that is CDM and similar instruments are not considered.
The first order conditions of (1) are:
(2a) 2 0, 1, 2,..., 2 0, 1, 2,...,
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with 3(I+J) equations and 3(I+J)+1 unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate demand, that is
which allows us to solve for the permit price π as well. (2) solves as:
So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs of emission reduction increase. All countries face the same marginal costs of emission reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price.
The modelled market behaves as expected.
We consider two cases. First, model (1-3) is applied separately to the emissions covered by the European Trading System and to the remaining emissions which are covered by the newly created Member State exchange for non-ETS emission allocation. Second, model (1-3) is applied to ETS emissions only. Note that the solution for non-ETS emissions without the market in emission permits (P i =0) is trivial.
Certified emission reductions and the market in CDM warrants
The model in Section 2.1 was used to investigate the properties of the ETS and non-ETS There may also be interior solutions, in which CERs are shared between ETS and non-ETS, or indeed not fully used. Also in this case, there is no need for a CDM warrant market through which ETS and non-ETS targets are re-allocated. The ETS and non-ETS markets are well able to do that.
That is, if there are markets for both ETS and non-ETS emission rights, there is no need for a market in CDM warrants. Rational actors would not trade at that market.
Note that the EU did create an ETS market, a non-ETS market, and a CDM warrant market. The warrant market is redundant. If all parties in all markets are aware of this, the warrant market is just a piece of unnecessary but otherwise innocent regulation. If not, confusion may be the result.
If there is no market for non-ETS permit, but there is a CDM warrant market, the following would happen. Let us assume that the ETS and CER prices are lower than the marginal abatement costs in the non-ETS sector in all Member States. Then, for a given supply of CERs, countries solve the problem:
where D is the maximum amount of CERs that can be used; W is the net amount of CDM warrants bought; π C is the price of CERs; and π W is the price of CDM warrants. To understand the notation, first consider W = 0. In this case, is π W ineffective and the emission abatement obligation is reduced by D. If W > 0, country i buys more CERs and has to buy CDM warrants as well; but in return reduces less at home. If W < 0, country i buys fewer CERs, sells warrants, and reduces more at home. And, of course, the amount of CDM warrants sold cannot exceed the country's limit on CDM access D.
This has first order conditions:
This solves as (5c) and
relates the shadow price of the availability of CERs to its constraint. The shadow price is the willingness to pay to release the constraint at the margin, so Equation (6c) is in fact an inverse demand function. Equation (6c) is linear, so it is obvious that it doubles as an inverse supply function for those countries that would sell their CDM warrants to other countries. The market clears where π W is such that all μ i s are zero and the sum total of CERs is equal to total allowed use of the CDM.
If non-ETS marginal costs are higher than the ETS price in some countries, but lower in others, 5 there is an additional opportunity for arbitrage. Countries would supply a share of their CDM warrants to the non-ETS and use the remainder to buy CERs and sell them in the ETS -up to the point where the price of a CDM warrant equals the price difference between ETS and CDM. There need not be an interior solution to this, in which case all CERs go to either ETS or non-ETS.
Model calibration
The model is calibrated in four steps. The 2020 emission reduction targets are relative to 2005 emissions. We use two sets of data for total greenhouse gas emissions in 2005: the official country statistics as reported to the UNFCCC, and the emissions reported in impact assessment of the European Commission (Capros et al. 2008) . See Table A1 .
There are substantial, unexplained differences between the data. The UNFCCC data allow for a reasonable approximation of the ETS share in the 2005 emissions. 6 See Table   A2 . The sector detail is much less for the European Commission data, and therefore I use an upper and lower bound of the ETS share, by putting all industry emissions and all nonenergy CO2 emissions inside or outside the ETS. I refer to these calibrations as EUmax and EUmin. The European Commission study reports total emissions in 2005 and 2020 as well as growth rates for ETS and non-ETS emissions. Together, this implies ETS and 5 Recall that there are countries with hot air. These countries would supply all their CDM warrants to other countries as long as the warrant price or the ETS is greater than the CER price. 6 Note that the ETS / non-ETS split is an approximation because the UNFCCC statistics follow the sectoral classification of the International Energy Agency, while the ETS is based on installations. For instance, the power plant of a large university would be classified as "institutional" in the UNFCCC -and would thus be placed outside the ETS even though it is in reality covered. Table A2 ), which suggests that there are further problems with the data of Capros et al. (2008) . Table A1 for the total emissions, and Table A2 for the ETS share.
I use a single projection (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) The unit cost parameters α i for non-ETS emissions are set such that the cost-effective non-ETS emission reduction targets of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) are cost-effective in this model as well. See Table A4 . For EUmid, there is a variant: I calibrate the unit cost parameters such that the marginal cost is as reported in the impact assessment of the European Commission (CEC 2008a; CEC 2008b) .
9 I refer to this scenario as EUprice.
Scenarios and results
Policy scenarios
I distinguish seven different policy cases. See Table 1 . In all cases, there is trade in emission permits in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. In the first case, the ETS is the only flexibility instrument. In the second case, I add the non-tradable 1% access to CDM for selected countries, and let Member States chose whether to loosen ETS or non-ETS targets. In the third case, I add the 3% access to CDM, and let Member States freely allocate this to either the ETS or the non-ETS sector. In the fourth case, there is trade in CDM warrants between those countries that have allocated their CERs to their non-ETS emissions. In the fifth case, there is no CDM, but there is a market for non-ETS emission permits. In the sixth case, I reintroduce the 1% CDM for selected countries; and in the seventh case, I add the 3% CDM. Table 3 shows the permit price. With the ETS only, the permit price is calibrated to be €40/tCO 2 . This falls to €35/tCO 2 with CDM access, and to €30/tCO 2 with both CDM and non-ETS trade -the latter result holds because trade in non-ETS allotments takes the pressure of that sector and releases CERs to the ETS. CDM warrants would trade at €23/tCO 2 -that is, Member States are prepared to pay €23/tCO 2 for the right to buy a CER at the assumed price of €10/tCO 2 /tCO 2 . The ETS price is €33/tCO 2 in this case. In the non-ETS sector, the permit price is €27. This is always below the ETS price, so no CDM is deployed to offset non-ETS emissions (cf. Table 2 ). Table 3 also shows that if the CDM limit is raised from 3.0% to 3.8%, the ETS and non-ETS price are equal, that is, the emissions target is met at the lowest possible cost. The permit price is then €27/tCO 2 .
EU-wide results
The above results hold for one particular interpretation of the base year (2005), the no policy scenario, and the marginal abatement cost curve. Tables 2 and 3 also show results for the four alternative calibrations outlined in the previous section. The qualitative pattern in Table 2 is identical: More flexibility means lower costs, and the CDM is more effective at lowering costs than the Swedish proposal. Table 3 confirms this, but finds that the ETS price converges to the non-ETS price! In fact, if all CERs were allocated to the ETS, the ETS price would fall below the non-ETS price. That would be irrational, so
CERs are shared between the two markets. Table 2 shows that less than one-third of the CERs is allocated to the non-ETS sector in the EUmin calibration, and less than onetwentieth in the other three calibrations. That is, the interaction between the three markets is such they in fact function as a single market.
In each of the five alternative model calibrations, the non-ETS permit price is below the ETS permit price. The reason is the overallocation of non-ETS permits to countries in Eastern and Southern Europe. In order to test the sensitivity of the results to this, Tables 2   and 3 show the results of higher projected emissions and higher non-ETS abatement costs, in both cases taking the EUmid calibration for 2005. Not surprisingly, emission reduction costs are higher. The qualitative pattern in Table 2 does not change, however.
More flexibility means lower costs, and CDM access is more important than non-ETS trade. Tables 2 and 3 show what happens if the price of CERs is not €10/tCO 2 but rather €5/tCO 2 or €15/tCO 2 . The impact is minimal. Overall costs fall or rise with a higher CER price, but the effect is not very large. ETS and non-ETS permit prices are hardly affected as they are still much higher than the CER price. The only substantial impact is on the price of CDM warrants: The higher (lower) the CER price, the lower (higher) the warrant price, almost one-to-one with the CER price. The effect on abatement is muted, however, kept in check by market forces and alternative options to abate emissions. In the base case (€10/tCO 2 ), 66.09% of CERs are used to offset ETS emissions. With a low CER price (€5/tCO 2 ), this rises to 66.11%; with a high CER price (€15/tCO 2 ) this falls to 65.96%. Table 4 shows the total cost of emission abatement for each of the 27 Member States in the 7 policy cases, for the EUmid calibration and for costs, projections, and CER price as in the central case.
Results per Member State
There is substantial variation in costs between the Member States if the ETS is the only flexibility mechanism. The EU average of 1.3% of GDP hides gains of 10.1% for Bulgaria and losses of 5.1% for Latvia. Increasing flexibility reduces the overall costs to the EU and to most of the Member States. However, Latvia faces the highest costs in all policy scenarios, and its costs fall by less than the average as flexibility increases. This is because its marginal abatement cost curve is shallower than any other Member State, so that it cannot compete at the margin. Cyprus and Poland turn from net losers to net winners as flexibility increases, and the Czech Republic similar sees more export opportunities with increasing flexibility. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Estonia (non-ETS only), and Malta are outcompeted and see their gains of permit trade fall as flexibility increases. This implies that increased flexibility is not Pareto superior. The current regulation (ETS only) creates scarcity rents that some Member States would prefer to keep. Table 5 shows the total allocation of CERs, and the CERs used to offset non-ETS emissions in case the ETS is the only flexibility mechanism. Without a market for CDM warrants, the pattern of ETS/non-ETS allocation essentially follows the marginal abatement costs. Countries with high (low) non-ETS abatement costs allocate all (none) of their CERs to the non-ETS sectors. For some countries, the marginal abatement costs in the non-ETS are sufficiently close to the ETS price. These countries allocate part of their CERs to the non-ETS sector, and the remainder to the ETS.
With a market for CDM warrants, the allocation changes for two reasons. First, prices and marginal costs change. This leads to a reallocation between ETS and non-ETS independent of trade per se. Belgium is an example. Second, some countries reallocate part of their CERs to the non-ETS sector for the sole purpose of selling them on to other Member States. Poland is an example. Table 5 also shows the market shares at the market for CDM warrants. The market is concentrated both at the demand and the supply side. At the supply side, the HHI is 1665, usually a reason for concern. Poland is the biggest seller, with almost one-third of the market. The Czech Republic, Greece and Romania each have more than 10% of the market. At the demand side, concentration is even higher with a HHI of 3924. Denmark buys 58% of all warrants, Luxemburg 21% and Sweden 11%.
Discussion and conclusion
The European Union (EU) plans to introduce four kinds of flexibility in the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2013-2020: (1) the emissions trading scheme (ETS), a permit market for companies in selected sectors; (2) trade between Member State in non-ETS emission reduction obligations; (3) investments in (the successor to) the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to reduce emissions outside the EU; and (4) trade between Member States in CDM warrants. This paper considers the interactions between these four markets.
The key findings are as follows. Greater flexibility reduces overall costs. However, limited flexibility creates rents for certain Member States, which consequently may oppose increased flexibility. Access to the CDM is more effective at reducing costs than is non-ETS trade. The market in CDM warrants is small, concentrated, and relatively ineffective in case there is no trade in non-ETS allotments. If there is non-ETS trade, the CDM warrant market is superfluous. These results are robust to the calibration of the model and to the projections of future emissions. The prices of carbon in the ETS and the non-ETS sector converge due to access to the CDM. In some calibrations, convergence is compete for the proposed access limit to the CDM while in other calibrations a relatively modest extension of the limit would imply that there is a single price for greenhouse gas emissions across Member States and sectors.
The above results come with a number of caveats. The results are based on a simple model. More elaborate models would be harder to solve without adding much insightunless, of course, interactions and complications are introduced that are omitted from the current analysis. Chief among these are EU energy policy; intra-union trade in goods and services; and interactions with fiscal, energy and agricultural policy. The current paper tacitly assumes that permit markets are perfect. I do find signs of market power for the trade of CDM warrants -but that market is obsolete. The non-ETS market may be imperfect too. The current paper also omits any discussion of how markets could and should be designed. I simply assumed that there will be functioning markets. The proposed regulations are complicated, and this increases the administrative burden of companies and regulators alike. The proposed regulations also have a number of ambiguities, the most important of which is the creation of an obsolete market. These issues will be ironed out, but they do increase regulatory uncertainty in the interim. All of these issues are deferred to future research.
Subject to these caveats, however, the bottom-line conclusion of this paper is that the European Union created, in a roundabout way and with unnecessary administrative costs and regulatory uncertainty, a set of regulations for greenhouse gas emission abatement that is close to cost-effective or perhaps even cost-effective. Table 3 . The price of emission permits (in €/tCO 2 ) in the ETS, the warrant market for CDM, and the non-ETS, for nine alternative model calibrations and seven policy cases (cf. Table 1 ). The second-right-most column shows the limit to the CDM for which ETS and non-ETS equilibrate, and the right-most column the price at which the two markets equilibrate. 
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